[AG-TECH] VV Spatial metaphor (was AG Security)

[Jay Beavers]

I think there's a strong need for a venue to be more than a convenient
set of IPs to be used for conferencing.  There's a strong concept of
"team portal" that's been growing ever stronger in the last few years
from team sites in Lotus Notes to Groove to Sharepoint Team Services.
This is where a group of people working towards a common cause share
files, discussions, etc.

If you see my thread back a ways called "Venue What Art Thou", I suggest
that we don't tightly couple the IP addresses to this team site.  We
introduce scalability problems (# of multicast IPs vs # teams) and
administrative problems (I want a team portal, who do I call to assign
an IP, or I want to use Lotus Notes to store my files but still use AG
for team meetings).  I do suggest that we give Venue more 'personality'
than 'just another IP address'.  By personality, I mean name, icon,
background graphic, etc. so that people can 'bond' a little with their
virtual meeting space just like they bond with their physical meeting
spaces.


IMHO, we should work towards a solution that allows a Venue to be easily
added to a team portal, while still having both value and personality
when used outside of a team portal.  Trying to replicate team portals
inside a Venue would be a lot of work and would limit AG acceptance with
users who already had a team portal in use.

-----Original Message-----
From: Tony Rimovsky [mailto:tony at ncsa.uiuc.edu] 
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2002 12:55 PM
To: Shawn Davis
Cc: judson at mcs.anl.gov; ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
Subject: Re: [AG-TECH] VV Spatial metaphor (was AG Security)

Shawn -- I think your assesment of the current usage is dead on.
Whatever advantages there might be of a spacial metaphor don't work at
all in an environment where the consumers just wait for the right
windows and the node operators fast-click their way through multiple
steps to show the consumer what they expect to see.  Like changing
channels with a remote control.

I think the intention of the AG was to be mud-like, with a geographic
concept and users who can wander around to see what is going on or go
to fixed locations for topical discussions, like you do in regular
office space.  However, the desire of the consumers is for the AG to
be IM-like.  Ad-hoc, point to point or limited many-to-many
communication.

Frankly given the idea of personal access grids, using PGP keys for
encryption might work well.  A few of the open source IM clients can
already do this.





On Fri, Jul 19, 2002 at 01:49:58PM -0500, Shawn Davis wrote:
> In a general sense, the AG is a utility to hold video conference
meetings 
> with multiple locations.
> I'm a little bit lost on what the idea of spatial idea really does to 
> benefit the experience of the AG.  I may be missing something critical
here 
> simply because I've only been involved with the AG for the past year
and 
> half, and may be missing out on some of the key goals that were set
forth 
> when the AG idea was created.  But here's how I see it:
> 
> As it stands right now, I see the process of navigating through the
lobby 
> to the appropriate venue to be nothing more than that - a process.
I'm not 
> strolling through the AG virtual world, I'm going to a virtual venue,
a 
> destination, for the sole purpose of attending a meeting.  What if I
could 
> bypass the navigation and simply go straight to my destination?  This
is 
> the capability I have provided within AGSchedule.  Because the
ultimate 
> goal of an AG meeting is to get everyone communicating on the same set
of 
> multicast IP addresses, I've created a way to bypass the navigation
and go 
> straight to your destination.  A time-saving feature, as I see it.
Plus, 
> you don't necessarily need to know where exactly your destination is -
you 
> just go there.  After all, what does it matter?  When you get there,
it all 
> looks the same.  Everything works the same way.  Your
audience/participants 
> aren't affected in the slightest bit by where in this virtual world
the 
> meeting is taking place.
> 
> Even if the spatial metaphor for virtual venues is further developed
into 
> something that is more apparent, how does this help the ability to 
> communicate effectively on the AG?
> -Shawn
> 
> At 12:30 PM 7/19/2002 -0500, Ivan R. Judson wrote:
> 
> >I like this conversation, but am afraid in both cases (Stephen's
example
> >and Sean's scheduler) the spatial metaphor is lost.  Spatial
information
> >(more deeply than the UI metaphor) is integral to the concept of the
> >venues and the AG as a whole.
> >
> >The scheduler is a tool to make "formal reservation and preparation"
of
> >a virtual space easier.  The goal in the end is what can you do
> >to,in,on,around the space.  The space is implicitly defining the
> >meta-information about multicast groups, users, presence, services,
etc.
> >Perhaps if we define what the venue is supposed to be (ie, what data
it
> >holds, services it provides, etc) that would be a good first step in
the
> >process of understanding the appropriate place for various aspects of
> >security to live in the AG.
> >
> >This would be a cool place to insert some idea (or requirement) like:
> >
> >- The Venue should not be responsible for stream encryption key
> >generation and distribution, or
> >- The Venue should be capable of stream encryption key generation,
but
> >allow participants to use other mechanisms to generate and use
> >encryption keys for stream encryption
> >
> >There are many other variants, but something concrete like a set of
> >sentences that represent what people desire might make it easier to
> >filter through the real issues and find a good clear path out of
this.
> >
> >Thoughts?
> >
> >--Ivan
> >
> >..........
> >Ivan R. Judson .~. http://www.mcs.anl.gov/~judson
> >Futures Laboratory .~.  630 252 0920
> >Argonne National Laboratory .~. 630 252 6424 Fax
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: owner-ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
> >> [mailto:owner-ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov] On Behalf Of Deb Agarwal
> >> Sent: Friday, July 19, 2002 12:18 PM
> >> To: s.booth at epcc.ed.ac.uk
> >> Cc: ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
> >> Subject: Re: [AG-TECH] AG Security
> >>
> >>
> >> Stephen,
> >>
> >> Just my 2 cents worth on the topic.
> >>
> >> We do not have an implementation ready to distribute yet, but
> >> we are working on distributed key agreement that will work as
> >> you say. The venues server can act as the authorization
> >> server and then the participants do distributed key agreement
> >> using our protocol.  This way the venues server only (or
> >> whatever you want to use for authorization) only needs to
> >> know public keys that are authorized at most and normally
> >> only knows distinguished names and a trusted CA.  If you want
> >> to look at our work so far, the pointer is
> >> www-itg.lbl.gov/CIF/GroupComm.
> >>
> >> Deb
> >>
> >> S.Booth wrote:
> >> > On Fri, 19 Jul 2002, Ivan R. Judson wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>Hey Stephen,
> >> >>
> >> >>I'm not sure I follow your argument below:
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>>This implies that the encryption key is generated by the
> >> >>>venues server and we therefore have to trust the venues
> >> >>>server (not that we don't trust you but its the principle of
> >> >>>the thing) An alternative model would be that the meeting
> >> >>>organiser generated a token for each expected participant
> >> >>>containing the encryption key and the time of the meeting.
> >> >>>The token is public key encrypted. These can then be stored
> >> >>>on the venues server, sent by email, stored on a public
> >> >>>website whatever.
> >> >>
> >> >>I think having an automated mechanism for doing key distribution
is
> >> >>the goal, whether that's done via the venues server (which
> >> makes sense
> >> >>in the ivory tower model), or other means is definitely open to
> >> >>discussion.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>My personal model for this moving into the future is that a
> >> venue is
> >> >>something somebody or some group owns.  That means that person or
> >> >>group can alter "permissions" on the venue, ie, who's allowed to
> >> >>enter/exit, modify the venue, introduce new applicaions,
services,
> >> >>etc.  This requires identification and authorization.
> >> >>
> >> >>Currently, we haven't integrated the notion of users into the AG
> >> >>completely.  If we did there might be a richer set of data
> >> to use for
> >> >>exploring different identity and authorization mechanisms.
> >> >>
> >> >>Getting back to your point, I think it makes infinitely
> >> more sense to
> >> >>say,
> >> >>
> >> >>The participants for this private meeting are:
> >> >>
> >> >>Ivan
> >> >>Stephen
> >> >>Bob
> >> >>Jennifer
> >> >>
> >> >>And have some mechanism in place to "lock" other
> >> participants out of a
> >> >>venue, in addition to "throwing them out" of a venue they
> >> don't belong
> >> >>in.  In addition, I think the metaphor is "private meeting" not
> >> >>"encrypting streams", the mechanisms for making a meeting private
> >> >>include encrypting streams, but also allocating different
multicast
> >> >>addresses for each meeting, or perhaps other more creative
things.
> >> >>
> >> >>Does that make sense?
> >> >>
> >> >>--Ivan
> >> >>
> >> >>PS -- I don't find the ACL to be the problem in the current
> >> model, I
> >> >>find the problem is Bob is the only one who can edit it to
> >> be the real
> >> >>problem :-).  That being said, we've just institued a
> >> policy whereby
> >> >>bob no longer can have vacation since he's so critical to this
> >> >>part...NOT
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > I think you are entirely right about the model for the user
> >> interface
> >> > model. You integrate with a booking system and select
participants
> >> > from the database. The nsca scheduler already does this. I'm more
> >> > concerned with how you would implement this interface in a secure
> >> > fashion. OK the probability of someone trying to break AG
> >> is low but
> >> > cryptography is fun.
> >> >
> >> > Imagine you modify the ncsa scheduler to optionally supply
> >> a randomly
> >> > generated session key to booked sessions. Lets think how you
would
> >> > break this system. Assuming we don't have the compute power
> >> to brute
> >> > force the session key the next obvious step is to try to
> >> hack into a
> >> > system that has the key. Obviously any one of the meeting
> >> participants
> >> > would do, but if the key was originally generated by the
scheduler
> >> > this becomes the most attractive target to attack as you
> >> could subvert
> >> > the code that generated the key and gain access to ALL private
> >> > sessions. On the other hand if the scheduler only holds a
> >> database of
> >> > public-keys for AG users and public-key encrypted session keys
are
> >> > generated on the home machine of the person making the booking
then
> >> > uploaded to the scheduler the user interface looks the same but
the
> >> > security risk is much less.
> >> >
> >> > Of course this is probably overkill for most AG users.
> >> Maybe we should
> >> > just lobby for a single dialog box on the event server to make it
> >> > easier to set the session key by hand, then tell people to
exchange
> >> > keys by secure email. If you are not paranoid you probably
> >> don't care
> >> > about encryption. If you are then you won't trust an
> >> automated system
> >> > anyway :-)
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >                             Stephen
> >> >
> >>
======================================================================
> >> > |epcc| Dr Stephen P Booth             Project Manager
> >>     |epcc|
> >> > |epcc| s.booth at epcc.ed.ac.uk          Phone 0131 650 5746
> >>     |epcc|
> >> >
> >>
======================================================================
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >> ~~~~~~~~~
> >> Deb Agarwal                          e-mail:DAAgarwal at lbl.gov
> >> MS50B-2239                           phone :(510)486-7078
> >> Lawrence Berkeley National Lab       URL:
http://www-itg.lbl.gov/~deba
> >> Berkeley, CA 94720
> >> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >> ~~~~~~~~~
> >>
>