[AG-TECH] AG Security

[Jeffrey Eschbach]

For more secure talks we've used the phone line (through the Gentner)
for audio, either through a direct call or through a conference bridge. 
We still access a venue with Vic on the display & video machines (RAT
not enabled).  This gives us a comparable AG node experience, we can be
confident that the phone calls are secure, and eavesdropping on the
video alone was not a concern.

It's a total hack, and somewhat against the spirit of the overall
effort, but just something to consider if necessary.

Jeff



Allan Spale wrote:
> 
> The basic level of security on the AG that was discussed during the
> presentation was at least telephone secure (i.e. most people do not have
> the capability to "tap" your phone call, but some people do).  Of course,
> you make an excellent point with not using insecure channels if something
> requires the highest level of security.
> 
> Allan
> EVL at UIC
> node-op
> 
> On Thu, 18 Jul 2002, Hails, Bob wrote:
> 
> > There's also no guarantee that someone isn't standing in one of the
> > rooms outside the view of the camera.  A good rule of thumb is that you
> > shouldn't say or do anything in front of a camera or microphone that you
> > wouldn't want to be public knowledge.  If there is content that
> > absolutely positively must be kept secure then this might not be the
> > best medium to use.
> >
> >
> > bob hails | director of distance education
> >
> > sam m. walton college of business
> > reynolds center for enterprise development | room 112
> > university of arkansas
> > fayetteville, ar   72701
> >
> > hails at walton.uark.edu
> > tel:  479.575.2366
> > fax: 479.575.6999
> > url:  http://wcob.uark.edu/disted
> > IM: therealbobhails  (AIM & Yahoo)
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ivan R. Judson [mailto:judson at mcs.anl.gov]
> > Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 1:31 PM
> > To: 'Allan Spale'; ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
> > Subject: RE: [AG-TECH] AG Security
> >
> >
> >
> > There is never any guarantee (nor mechanism to detect, necessarily) if
> > someone is eavesdropping via multicast.  However, if the streams are
> > encrypted, then you decrease the probability that eavesdroppers can gain
> > access to the data, related to the amount of effort and resources they
> > have to crack the crypto method you use.
> >
> > On another note, the key distribution mechanism we use for the secure
> > room is a prototype.  Yes it is cumbersome, no it isn't the way it
> > should be done.  SecureID cards, key chain devices, or even biometric
> > sensors could be used to do key management or
> > identification/authentication.  We haven't had to do that for 1.0, which
> > means we can focus on building 2.0 with those features in place (which
> > they are).
> >
> > If you want to eliminate eavesdropping, the easiest mechanism is to use
> > a bridge, which has performance trade-offs.
> >
> > --Ivan
> >
> > ..........
> > Ivan R. Judson .~. http://www.mcs.anl.gov/~judson
> > Futures Laboratory .~.  630 252 0920
> > Argonne National Laboratory .~. 630 252 6424 Fax
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
> > > [mailto:owner-ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov] On Behalf Of Allan Spale
> > > Sent: Thursday, July 18, 2002 1:24 PM
> > > To: ag-tech at mcs.anl.gov
> > > Subject: [AG-TECH] AG Security
> > >
> > >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > One of the questions today that I received during my
> > > presentation about the Access Grid concerned security.
> > > Specifically, how can one guarantee that no one can eavesdrop
> > > (video and/or audio) on an AG session.  I am somewhat aware
> > > about the Secure Room and its purpose, but what other options
> > > are there?  When I described this process, my explanation
> > > made this process of reserving this room seem cumbersome
> > > (i.e. having to specifically request use of the Secure Room
> > > as opposed to reserving a non-secure venue).
> > >
> > > The other idea I thought about was setting up an
> > > instituition-level venues server (Virtual Venues server
> > > software).  If this was done, what assurances would there be
> > > to keep people from eavesdroping on the internal session.
> > >
> > > Taking this one step further, if there were shared
> > > applications used during a session (and I do not think
> > > exposing DPPT data streams would really matter, but for the
> > > sake of argument), it is more of the writers of the
> > > applications to provide their own security mechanism to
> > > assure that the data streams are secured?
> > >
> > > I would appreciate any people sharing their information with
> > > me.  In this way, I can help address the security issue in a
> > > much better manner in any future AG presentation.  Thanks.
> > >
> > >
> > > Allan
> > > EVL at UIC
> > > node-op
> > >
> > >
> >

-- 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Eschbach                              eschbach at motorola.com
Networks and Infrastructure Research
Senior Staff Engineer, Motorola Labs Internet2 Initiative
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Desk: (847) 538-5846                      Mobile: (847) 980-2240